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a b s t r a c t 
This paper examines the links between a firm’s internationalization status and the type and degree of market 
imperfections in product and labor markets. We develop a framework for modelling heterogeneity across firms 
in terms of (i) product market power (price-cost markups), (ii) labor market imperfections (workers’ bargaining 
power during worker-firm negotiations or a firm’s degree of wage-setting power) and (iii) revenue productivity. 
We apply this framework to analyze whether the pricing behavior of firms in product and labor markets differs 
across firms that engage in different forms of internationalization using an unbalanced panel of 7,458 manufac- 
turing firms over the period 1994-2012 in Japan. Engagement in international activities is found to matter for 
determining not only the type of imperfections in product and labor markets but also the degree of imperfections. 
Clear differences in behavior between firms that serve the foreign market either through exporting or through 
FDI are observed. Exporters are more likely to be characterized by imperfect competition in the product market 
whereas the opposite holds for multinationals. Exporters are more likely to share rents based on the bargain- 








































During the past decades, the relationship between globalization and
ages has been at the center of debate in industrialized countries. A
rowing theoretical literature emphasizes trade-induced variation in
rm-specific wages as one of the main drivers of increased wage in-
quality. 
Building on a Melitz (2003) -type trade model, there exist various
eterogeneous-firms approaches to trade and wage inequality which all
raw on imperfect factor markets but differ in terms of the rent-sharing
echanism between workers and firms that generate inter-firm wage
ispersion even with ex ante identical workers. In spite of the growing
mportance of labor market imperfections in theoretical trade models,
o empirical study has so far investigated how product and labor mar-
et imperfections vary across firms that differ in terms of engagement in☆ We gratefully acknowledge the insightful comments and suggestions by the Edito
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927-5371/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. nternational activities. This paper serves the purpose of examining het-
rogeneity in product and labor market imperfections across exporters,
on-exporters, multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non-MNEs. 
We contribute to the econometric literature on identifying firm-
pecific market imperfections and the empirical international trade lit-
rature along various dimensions. Our first contribution is a method-
logical one. We develop an econometric framework that allows for
hree-dimensional firm heterogeneity: product market power (price-cost
arkups), labor market imperfections (workers’ bargaining power dur-
ng worker-firm negotiations or a firm’s degree of wage-setting power)
nd revenue total factor productivity (TFP). Rather than following
tandard practice and imposing a particular imperfect labor market
odel on the data, we let the data determine the type of competi-
ion prevailing in product and labor markets. We accomplish this byr and two anonymous referees. We also benefited from useful discussions with 
hihiro Okubo, Stefano Schiavo and other participants at various conferences and 
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w  uilding on the econometric reduced-form productivity model with im-
erfect product and labor markets which has been developed in and
obbelaere and Mairesse (2013) . As such, we derive product and la-
or market imperfection parameters and regression-based TFP measures
rom estimating microeconomic production functions. Dobbelaere and
airesse (2013) consider a Cobb-Douglas production technology and
se the parametric generalized method of moments approach, which re-
ies on instrumental variables, to obtain consistent estimates of industry-
pecific product and labor market imperfection parameters. We assume
 flexible functional form of the production function (translog) and em-
loy the semiparametric structural control function approach, that uses
bserved variables and economic theory to invert out productivity non-
arametrically, in order to get consistent estimates of product and labor
arket imperfections and TFP at the firm-year level. 
The theoretical structural productivity model behind the economet-
ic reduced-form productivity model nests two polar models of wage
etermination in imperfect labor markets in the seminal productivity
odel of Hall (1988) which allows to estimate price-cost markups: the
trongly efficient bargaining model (one of the two canonical collec-
ive bargaining models; McDonald and Solow, 1981 ) allocates market
ower to employees through costs of firing, hiring and training while the
tatic partial equilibrium monopsony model ( Manning, 2003 ) allocates
arket power to employers through allowing workers to have hetero-
eneous preferences over workplace environments of different potential
mployers, which generates upward-sloping labor supply curves to in-
ividual firms. 
The second contribution is to apply our econometric framework to
nalyze the type and the degree of product and labor market imper-
ections in firms that differ in terms of internationalization, while ac-
ounting for differences in revenue productivity. To accomplish this, we
se an unbalanced panel of 7,458 manufacturing firms in Japan cover-
ng the period 1994-2012. As such, our analysis aims at improving our
nderstanding of the wage determination process in firms that engage
ifferently in international activities through discerning whether either
arket power on the supply side of labor or market power on the de-
and side of labor is predominantly responsible for driving a wedge
etween labor’s estimated marginal revenue product and its measured
ayment. To examine the link between the internationalization status
f firms and the type of competition prevailing in product and labor
arkets, we estimate (two-equation) probit models. To examine the re-
ationship between export/foreign direct investment (FDI) behavior and
he degree of product and labor market imperfections, we apply OLS re-
ression techniques. 
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, we find that en-
agement in international activities matters for determining the type
s well as the degree of imperfections in product and labor markets.
econd, we observe clear differences in behavior between firms that
erve the foreign market either through exporting or through FDI. Such
ontrasting findings suggest that the two major modes of globaliza-
ion, trade and FDI, have quite different consequences on firms’ market
ower. 
More precisely, focusing on differential impacts on the type of imper-
ections in the product market, we find that being an exporter increases
he likelihood of being characterized by imperfect competition in the
roduct market, even after controlling for productivity differences. This
esult might be explained by either differences in quality or differences
n demand elasticities and income across domestic and export markets.
n contrast, firms engaging in FDI are less likely to be characterized
y imperfect competition in the product market, even after controlling
or productivity differences between MNEs and non-MNEs. Strategies
f dumping and transfer pricing exerting opposite effects on markups
han channels of quality and demand elasticity differences could explain
his result. On the labor market side, we find that exporting firms are
ore likely to share rents based on the bargaining power of workers,
ut less likely to share rents based on the elasticity of the labor sup-
ly curve facing an individual employer. Strikingly, the opposite find-199 ng holds for MNEs: a firm’s wage-setting power rather than workers’
argaining power appears to generate wage dispersion across firms en-
aging in FDI. This differential form of firm-worker rent sharing across
xporters and MNEs matches with expectations. Exporting firms, charg-
ng higher markups and realizing higher rents, might be willing to share
art of these rents with their workers according to a surplus-sharing rule,
hereby increasing market power on the labor supply side. Intra-firm
ompetition in multinationals, triggered by the threat to transfer pro-
uction, R&D or some other tasks to a competing subsidiary, is likely to
ncrease intra-firm labor replacement. As such, MNEs could have con-
iderable monopsony power in the labor market, implying that market
ower could be consolidated on the labor demand side. 
Focusing on differential impacts on the degree of imperfections, we
nd that export status appears to be positively correlated with both
roduct market power (markups) and market power consolidated on
he labor supply side (workers’ bargaining power). Interestingly, export
tatus is positively correlated with the wage elasticity of a firm’s labor
upply curve. This indicates that exporting firms are less able to exploit
age-setting power. In contrast, a negative correlation is observed be-
ween MNE status and either markups or workers’ bargaining power.
he latter result could be explained by the fact that offshoring could in-
rease substitution between domestic and foreign workers. This might
n turn flatten the labor demand curve and shift bargaining power over
ent distribution from labor towards capital in MNEs. 
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides a re-
iew of the relevant theoretical literature and main empirical find-
ngs from which we derive conjectures about the relationships of in-
erest. Section 3 presents the main ingredients of the theoretical struc-
ural productivity model with imperfect product and labor markets.
ection 4 discusses our econometric model and the estimation proce-
ure. Section 5 presents the Japanese firm panel data. Section 6 ex-
mines how the type of competition prevailing in product and labor
arkets varies across firms that differ in terms of engagement in inter-
ational activities. Section 7 investigates potential links between inter-
ationalization and firms’ degree of product and labor market imperfec-
ions. Section 8 concludes. 
. Synopsis of related literature 
.1. Internationalization status and market imperfections 
Let us first summarize why pricing behavior might vary across firms
hat differ in terms of internationalization status based on existing the-
retical literature and most relevant empirical findings. 
Following an approach pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992) and
rugman (1980) , the Melitz (2003) model of international trade is char-
cterized by firm heterogeneity in productivity and fixed export costs,
nd monopolistic competition and generates trade-induced shifts in the
roductivity distribution through selection of efficient firms into export-
ng and inefficient firms into exit. This model does not provide a model
f income distribution as workers are symmetrically affected by trade
iberalization because the labor market is frictionless and all workers
re identical. 
A recent theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms and trade has
aid attention to the interaction between firms’ selection and labor mar-
ets. These various heterogeneous-firms approaches consider imperfect
abor markets that feature firm-worker rent sharing to be the key but
iffer in the precise mechanism that ties firm wages to firm perfor-
ance. A first approach considers fair wages ( Amiti and Davis, 2011;
gger and Kreickemeier, 2009 ) or efficiency wages ( Davis and Harri-
an, 2011 ) as a source of labor market imperfections, with productivity-
pecific wages resulting from a fair-wage effort mechanism in the former
nd different monitoring technologies in the latter. A second approach
ocuses on search and matching frictions such that ex-post bargaining
ver the surplus of production can potentially induce wages to vary
ith revenue across firms ( Co ş ar et al., 2016; Davidson et al., 2008;


















































































































A  ajgelbaum, 2013; Felbermayr et al., 2011; Helpman et al., 2010 ).
 third approach considers firm-level unionization as a source of la-
or market imperfections, with decentralized collective bargaining pro-
ucing inter-firm wage disparities ( Montagna and Nocco, 2013 ). To
he best of our knowledge, theories incorporating heterogeneous firms,
mperfect labor markets and FDI is limited to Egger and Kreicke-
eier (2013) who build on Melitz (2003) and develop a general equilib-
ium two-country model in which national firms and horizontal multi-
ational firms coexist and firm-level rent sharing results from fair wage
references of workers. 
Whereas the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution con-
umer demand in Melitz (2003) -type models ensures constant firm price-
ost markups, there is a large class of models that account for variable
rice-cost markups by imposing some assumptions on demand and mar-
et structure. Seminal papers are Bernard et al. (2003) , Melitz and Otta-
iano (2008) and Zhelobodko et al. (2012) , who develop heterogeneous-
rms models with variable markups, which allow prices and markups to
e affected by firm entry and market size. 1 Rather than modelling pro-
uctivity differences as producing a symmetric variety at lower marginal
ost, Crozet et al. (2012) model higher productivity as producing a
igher quality variety at equal cost, building on Melitz (2003) and
aldwin and Harrigan (2007) . In addition to these efficiency and qual-
ty channels, markup differences between exporters and domestic firms
ight be explained by a demand elasticity channel or by income dif-
erences across markets. Following a standard price discrimination ar-
ument, exporters can charge different prices between domestic and
xport markets because domestic and export markets are segmented
y trade costs. Also, exporters might charge higher prices on richer
arkets where consumers’ willingness to pay is higher. Whereas these
hree channels predict a positive relationship between export status and
arkups, a dumping strategy might work in the opposite direction.
ehrens et al. (2014) develop a general equilibrium model of monopo-
istic competition with heterogeneous firms, variable demand elasticity
nd multiple asymmetric regions, in which wages and markups are en-
ogenous and show that exporters could charge lower markups because
f tougher selection in the market. 
In contrast to exports, to the best of our knowledge, theoretical re-
earch on the relationship between FDI and firm markups is nonexistent.
iven that, since Helpman et al. (2004) , investment in foreign markets
s usually considered to be the following step (after exports) in the inter-
ationalization process, the same four underlying channels could shape
he relationship between MNE status and markups. Importantly, an ad-
itional channel might come into play, that is, transfer pricing behavior.
NEs encountering differing tax schedules might have an incentive to
hift profits to low-tax countries by altering transfer prices ( Copithorne,
971; Horst, 1971 ). 2 
On the empirical side, we can classify microeconometric studies test-
ng some of the predictions of the aforementioned models in several
roups. A first set of papers has established empirical support for Melitz’s
election effect, i.e. the positive relationship between a firm’s export
r MNE status and its productivity level. Helpman (2006) and Bernard
t al. (2007, 2012) review empirical evidence on the positive exporter1 Bernard et al. (2003) introduce Bertrand competition into Eaton and 
ortum’s (2002) probabilistic model of comparative advantage. Extending 
elitz (2003) , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a monopolistically com- 
etitive model with quasi-linear preferences. Zhelobodko et al. (2012) build a 
odel of monopolistic competition with variable costs and preferences over dif- 
erentiated products being additively separable across varieties. 
2 Transfer pricing is the practice whereby multinationals can manipulate re- 
orted profits of parents and affiliates by choosing the prices used to record 
ntrafirm transfers of, e.g., intellectual property or intermediate inputs. Many 
ountries’ tax laws explicitly try to minimize this practice, but to the extent 













200 roductivity premium and Temouri et al. (2008) on the positive MNE
roductivity premium. 
A second set of papers has provided evidence of the theoretical con-
ecture that reductions in trade costs lead to a positive correlation be-
ween exports/FDI and wages. For example, exploiting a trade liberal-
zation episode in Indonesia, Amiti and Davis (2011) show that a de-
rease in output tariffs raises wages of workers in exporting firms (see
arluccio and Bas, 2015; Harrison et al., 2011; Schank et al., 2007;
agner, 2012 for other references on evidence of exporter wage pre-
ia). Malchow-Møller et al. (2013) and Konings et al. (2016) review
vidence of MNE wage premia, which –in imperfectly competitive labor
arket settings– can be explained by fair wages concerns, the need to
oordinate wages across borders through rent sharing, efficiency wages
o induce effort and reduce shirking, or upward-sloping labor supply
urves. 
A third set of papers has empirically investigated the relationship
etween export status and price-cost markups. Most papers have pro-
ided evidence of a positive relationship which is either generated by
eterogeneity on the supply side (technical efficiency differences, see
.g. De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012 ; Kato, 2014 ) or by heterogene-
ty on the demand side (quality differences, see e.g. Bellone et al., 2016;
rozet et al., 2012; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013 ). Exploiting actual trade
iberalization episodes in India and China, De Loecker et al. (2016) ,
randt et al. (2017) and Fan et al. (2018) estimate the causal effect of
rade reforms on firm markups. They confirm that cost-reducing effects
f trade liberalization give firms a strong incentive to raise markups.
anova and Zhang (2012) provide empirical evidence on exporters
harging higher prices in richer destinations. Only very few studies have
ocused on the empirical relationship between MNE status and markups.
or example, Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) disentangle the efficiency
positive knowledge spillover) and competition channels of foreign pres-
nce on markups and find a negative short-run correlation between for-
ign presence and markups but a positive long-run correlation for firms
n knowledge-intensive industries. Although direct evidence of the im-
act of transfer pricing on markups is nonexistent, evidence of transfer
ricing is provided by Vicard’s (2015) and Cristea and Nguyen (2016) .
avies et al. (2018) show that the intensity of profit shifting is greater
or large MNEs. 
Imposing a particular rent-sharing mechanism on the data, a
ourth set of papers has investigated the relationship between open-
ess and labor market imperfections. Fabbri et al. (2003) and
örg et al. (2009) provide evidence of multinationals having higher
abor demand elasticities than domestic firms, hence, validating
odrik (1997) hypothesis that increased globalization has increased
abor demand elasticities through substitutability of domestic by for-
ign workers, thereby weakening workers’ bargaining power. Follow-
ng this line of reasoning, several studies have relied on a collective
argaining framework in a closed-economy setting to show evidence
f a relationship between international trade and workers’ bargain-
ng power using either firm panel data (e.g. Brock and Dobbelaere,
006 ; Dumont et al., 2006 ; Abraham et al. 2009 ; Boulhol et al. 2011 ;
hsan and Mitra 2014 ) or matched employer-employee data (e.g.
elbermayr et al., 2014) . 
Based on the argument that rent sharing may be conditioned by inter-
ational linkages, Budd and Slaughter (2004) extend the collective bar-
aining framework to an open-economy setting and provide evidence of
rofits being shared across borders within multinational firms (see also
udd et al., 2005) . Martins and Yang (2015) confirm their findings for a
uch wider set of parent-affiliate pairs, including parents and affiliates
n Japan. They show that international rent sharing, i.e. parents shar-
ng profits with foreign affiliates, is higher when affiliates are located in
ow-tax countries, which they interpret as evidence of transfer pricing. 3 3 Whereas these studies focus on a post-acquisition environment, 
onings et al. (2016) investigate how rent sharing changes before and af- 
































































































4 This assumption might be perceived as being restrictive, given that around 
one-third of total trade takes place within multinational firms’ boundaries and 
that trade in finished products is being gradually outpaced by trade in inter- 
mediates ( Hummels et al., 2001 ). We defend our restrictive assumption on two 
grounds. The first is a data reason. Conditional on introducing a third freely ad- 
justable input factor (by, e.g., splitting M it into raw materials and components, 
and energy), our static productivity model could be extended to accommodate 
imperfect competition in the intermediate input market by modelling such im- 
perfections as additional unit costs that create wedges between marginal costs 
and marginal products. However, data constraints preclude us from considering 
this choice. The second reason is that we prefer to focus our empirical analysis 
on investigating differences in pricing behavior in output and labor markets, ab- 
staining from the input sourcing choice of multinationals. For theoretical work 
on a firm’s optimal choice of outsourcing to unaffiliated suppliers versus in- 
tegrating input production and the firm itself, we refer, e.g., to Defever and 
Toubal (2013) and Carluccio et al. (2015) who build on the incomplete con- 
tracts approach to the theory of the firm, and Garetto (2013) who develops a 
general equilibrium framework. The former also empirically investigate the role 
of firm-specific observables in affecting a firm’s outsourcing decision. Relying on a search-and-matching framework, Davidson et al.
2014) show that openness improves the matching between workers and
rms using matched employer-employee data, while Lu et al. (2017) ex-
loit exogenous changes in China’s inward FDI regulations and estimate
he causal impact of liberalization of inward FDI on a firm’s monopsony
ower using firm panel data. They find that inward FDI liberalization
as increased employers’ wage-setting power whereas a negative corre-
ation is found between a firm’s export status and its wage-setting power.
.2. Testable conjectures 
As explained in the following Sections, the type of product market
mperfections (or the product market setting, denoted PMS) is either
erfect competition (PC) or imperfect competition (IC). This simple di-
hotomy is based on the price-cost markup, i.e. either no market power
r market power. As such, firms charging price-cost markups exceeding
ne are characterized by PMS = IC. The type of labor market imperfec-
ions (or the labor market setting, denoted LMS) is either perfect compe-
ition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR), efficient bargaining (EB) or
onopsony (MO). Intuitively, a firm in which the marginal employee
eceives a real wage equal to her marginal product is characterized by
MS = PR whereas a firm in which the marginal employee is paid a real
age exceeding (lower than) her marginal product is characterized by
MS = EB (LMS = MO). 
Let us now draw conjectures about the relationship between ex-
ort/MNE status and the type and the degree of product and labor mar-
et imperfections from the available theories and empirical analyses in
he existing literature. 
Theoretically, channels operating in opposite directions (efficiency,
uality, demand elasticity and income channel versus increased compe-
ition) make the relationship between exporters and markups ambigu-
us. The same holds for the relationship between MNEs and markups,
n which case transfer pricing practices reinforce the dumping strategy
competitive) effect. 
The vast majority of empirical studies provide evidence on a pos-
tive relationship between exporters and markups. This finding, cou-
led with the fact that the corporate income tax rate in Japan was the
ighest among the OECD during our sample period ( Hasegawa and Kiy-
ta, 2017 ) lead us to postulate the following testable conjectures. 
Conjecture 1a: Exporters are likely to operate in an imperfectly com-
etitive product market setting. 
Conjecture 1b: Multinationals are less likely to operate in an imper-
ectly competitive product market setting. 
Conjecture 2a: Export status is positively correlated with price-cost
arkups. 
Conjecture 2b: MNE status is not positively correlated with price-
ost markups. 
Available theoretical and empirical research does not prove infor-
ative when it comes to postulating a relationship between the inter-
ationalization status of firms and the type of labor market imperfec-
ions for the following reasons. First, a unified theoretical framework
n which the precise rent-sharing mechanism is modelled as an explicit
ecision by individual firms is non-existent and heterogeneous-firms ap-
roaches to trade and wage inequality take a stand on a specific model
f imperfectly competitive labor markets. Second, empirical studies pro-
iding evidence on the relationship between globalization and labor
arket imperfections impose a precise form of firm-worker rent shar-
ng on the data. Based on indirect empirical evidence on exporters be-
ng more likely to sign firm-level collective bargaining agreements by
arluccio and Bas (2015) , empirical evidence on multinationals per-
eiving higher labor demand elasticities and the possibility of Japaneseer a foreign takeover and how wages in the target company are determined by 




201 NEs engaging in international rather than domestic rent sharing as
art of a transfer pricing strategy, we derive the following conjectures. 
Conjecture 3a: Exporters are likely to operate in a collective bar-
aining labor market setting. 
Conjecture 3b: Multinationals are less likely to operate in a collec-
ive bargaining labor market setting. 
Conjecture 4a: Export status is positively correlated with workers’
argaining power. 
Conjecture 4b: MNE status is not positively correlated with workers’
argaining power. 
. Theoretical structural productivity model with imperfect pro- 
uct and labor markets 
A firm i at time t produces output using the following production
echnology: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑄 𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾 𝑖𝑡 ) (1)
ith ( N it , M it ) a vector of static inputs in production free of adjustment
osts (labor and intermediate inputs) and K it capital treated as a dynamic
nput in production (predetermined in the short run). 
We assume that ( i ) Q it ( · ) is continuous and twice differentiable with
espect to its arguments, ( ii ) a firm takes the input price of materials as
iven 4 and ( iii ) producers active in the market are maximizing short-run
rofits. 
Let us turn to the firm’s short-run profit maximization problem. Firm
 ’s short-run profits, Πit , are given by: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽 𝑖𝑡 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 (2)
ith 𝑅 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 𝑄 𝑖𝑡 an increasing and concave revenue function, P it the
utput price and W it and J it the firm’s input prices for N and M , respec-
ively, at time t . 
Firm i must choose the optimal quantity of output and the optimal
emand for intermediate inputs and labor. The optimal output choice
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et share of firm i, 𝜂t the own-price elasticity of market demand, 𝜅it a
onjectural variations parameter and 𝜇it firm i ’s price-cost markup. 
5 5 If firms produce a homogeneous good and play Nash in quantities (Cournot 
ompetition), the price-cost markup 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑃 𝑡 
( 𝐶 𝑄 ) 𝑖𝑡 
would be equal to 
(










rice elasticity of market demand. If firms produce a differentiated good and 































































































p  The first-order condition for the optimal choice of intermediate in-
uts is given by setting the marginal revenue product of intermediate












 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 (5)
From Eq. (5) , it follows that profit maximization implies that opti-
al demand for intermediate inputs is satisfied when a firm equalizes
he output elasticity with respect to intermediate inputs, denoted by
 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 





, to the price-cost mark-up 𝜇it multiplied by the share
f intermediate input expenditure in total sales, denoted by 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 
𝐽 𝑖𝑡 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 𝑄 𝑖𝑡 
.
Firm i ’s optimal demand for labor depends on the characteristics
f its labor market. We distinguish three labor market settings: perfect
ompetition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR), strongly efficient bar-
aining (EB) and static partial equilibrium monopsony (MO). 
Under PR, labor is unilaterally determined by firm i from short-run
rofit maximization, which implies the following first-order condition:
 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 (6)
ith ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 





the output elasticity with respect to labor and
 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 𝑄 𝑖𝑡 
the share of labor expenditure in total sales. In the per-
ectly competitive labor market model, a firm takes the exogenously-
etermined market wage as given. A profit-maximizing firm always
hooses employment such that the marginal revenue product of labor
quals the wage ( Eq. (6) ). In the right-to-manage bargaining model, the
rm and its workers bargain over any surplus in order to determine the
age ( Nickell and Andrews, 1983 ). The firm continues to choose the
umber of workers it wishes to employ once wages have been deter-
ined by the bargaining process, which implies the same static first-
rder condition for labor as in the perfectly competitive labor market
odel. 
Under EB, the risk-neutral firm and its risk-neutral workers negotiate
imultaneously over wages and employment in order to maximize the
oint surplus of their economic activity ( McDonald and Solow, 1981 ).
n efficient wage-employment pair is obtained by maximizing a gen-
ralized Nash product 6 with respect to the wage rate and labor. The
ollowing first-order condition with respect to wages must hold at an
nterior optimum: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 
[ 




here 𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜙𝑖𝑡 
1− 𝜙𝑖𝑡 
is the relative extent of rent sharing and 𝜙it ∈ [0, 1] the
art of economic rents going to the workers. 
The first-order condition for labor is given by: 
 𝑖𝑡 = ( 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑡 
[ 




ith ( 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜕𝑅 𝑖𝑡 
𝜕𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
the marginal revenue product of labor. lay Nash in prices (Bertrand competition), the price-cost markup 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 
( 𝐶 𝑄 ) 𝑖𝑡 
ould be equal to 
(
1 + 1 
𝜂𝑖𝑡 
)−1 
, with 𝜂it a firm’s own-price elasticity of residual 
emand. 
6 The generalized Nash product is written as: Ω𝐸𝐵 = 
 
𝑁 𝑖𝑡 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 + 
(
𝑁 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
)
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 
} 𝜙𝑖𝑡 {
𝑅 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽 𝑖𝑡 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 
}1− 𝜙𝑖𝑡 with 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
he competitive employment level, 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 the workers’ alternative wage and 
it ∈ [0,1] the part of economic rents going to the workers or the degree of 








202 An efficient wage-employment pair is given by solving simultane-
usly the first-order conditions with respect to the wage rate and labor.
s such, the equilibrium condition is given by: 
 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 (9)
Eq. (9) traces out the locus of efficient wage-employment pairs,
nown as the contract curve. Given that 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 
( 𝑅 𝑄 ) 𝑖𝑡 
in equilibrium, with
 𝑅 𝑄 ) 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜕𝑅 𝑖𝑡 
𝜕𝑄 𝑖𝑡 
the marginal revenue, we obtain the following expression
or the output elasticity with respect to labor by combining Eqs. (7) and
9) : 
 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝛾𝑖𝑡 (1 − 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) (10)
So far, we have assumed that there is a potentially infinite supply of
mployees wanting a job in the firm. A small wage cut by the employer
ill result in the immediate resignation of all existing workers. However,
nder MO, the labor supply facing an individual employer might be less
han perfectly elastic because workers might have heterogeneous pref-
rences over workplace environments of different potential employers
 Manning, 2003 ). Such heterogeneity in e.g. firm location or job char-
cteristics (corporate culture, starting times of work) makes workers to
iew employers as imperfect substitutes. This in turn gives employers
on-negligible market power over their workers. 
Let us assume that the monopsonist firm is constrained to set a single
age for all his workers and faces labor supply N it ( W it ), which is an
ncreasing function of the wage W . Both N it ( W it ) and the inverse of this
elationship W it ( N it ) are referred to as the labor supply curve of this
rm. The monopsonist firm’s objective is to maximize its short-run profit




𝑁 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽 𝑖𝑡 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 , taking the labor supply curve
s given. Maximizing this profit function with respect to labor gives the
ollowing first-order condition: 7 





Rewriting Eq. (11) gives: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 (12)
ith 𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 
( 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 
= 
( 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 
1+( 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 
. 𝛽 it ≤ 1 represents the wage markdown and
 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 




∈ ℜ + the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve
hat firm i faces, measuring the degree of wage-setting power that firm












= 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 . Under monopsony, ( 𝜀 𝑁 𝑊 ) 𝑖𝑡 is finite and the labor
upply curve that firm i faces is upward sloping, hence, the firm sets
 it < ( R N ) it . As such, the degree of firm i ’s wage-setting power decreases
n the wage elasticity of its labor supply curve. 
Rewriting Eq. (12) and using that ( 𝑅 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑄 𝑁 ) 𝑖𝑡 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 
with ( Q N ) it the
arginal product of labor, gives the following expression for the elas-
icity of output with respect to labor: 
 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 
( 
1 + 1 





Using the first-order condition for intermediate inputs, we obtain
n expression for firm i ’s price-cost markup ( 𝜇it ) and using the first-
rder conditions for intermediate inputs and labor, we define firm i ’s
arameter of product and labor market imperfections ( 𝜓 it ), which we
abel firm i ’s joint market imperfections parameter, as follows: 
𝑖𝑡 = 




(14)7 From Eq. (11) , it follows that profit maximization implies that the optimal 
emand for labor is satisfied when a firm equalizes the marginal revenue product 
f labor to the marginal cost of labor. The latter is higher than the wage paid 
o the new worker W it ( N it ) by the amount ( W N ) it N it because the firm has to 
ncrease the wage paid to all workers it already employs whenever it hires an 
xtra worker. 


















































































𝑛𝑚 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑘 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑘 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 
8 By allowing for observed shifters (here IMP it ) that enter the optimal de- 
mand function for m it , but are excluded from the production function, we solve 
the non-identification problem of the output elasticity with respect to materi- 
als and, hence, are in a position to apply the control function approach for the 
estimation of a gross output production function (see Gandhi et al., 2017 ). In- 
tuitively, the non-identification problem would arise under 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚 𝑡 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 ) , 
because in that case, the only intermediate input demand shifter aside from the 
other inputs in the production function would be 𝜔 it . As the elasticity of output 
with respect to intermediate inputs is identified with how output varies with 
m it , holding fixed ( n it , k it ), the only source of variation in m it (namely 𝜔 it ) would 
also simultaneously shift output, causing the elasticity of output with respect to 
materials to be unidentified. 
9 Melitz and Levinsohn (2006) show that this strict monotonicity assumption 
holds as long as more productive firms do not set inordinately higher markups 
than less productive firms. 
10 Note that ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜕 ln 𝐹 ( ⋅) 
𝜕 ln 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
and ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜕 ln 𝐹 ( ⋅) 
𝜕 ln 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 
. These output elasticities are by 
definition independent of a firm’s productivity shock.  𝑖𝑡 = 










= 0 if LMS=PR (16) 
= 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝛾𝑖𝑡 
[ 
1 − 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 
𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 
] 
> 0 if LMS=EB (17) 
= − 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
1 
( 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 
< 0 if LMS=MO (18) 
. Econometric model 
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the output elasticities ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 
nd ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 , we only consider production functions with ( i ) a scalar Hicks-
eutral productivity term which is observed by the firm but unobserved
y the econometrician (denoted by 𝜔 it ) and ( ii ) common technology
arameters, governing the transformation of inputs to units of output,
cross a set of producers (denoted by the vector 𝜷). These two assump-
ions imply the following expression for the production function: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹 ( 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾 𝑖𝑡 ; 𝛃) exp ( 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 ) (19)
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function co-
fficients ( 𝜷) for each of the 15 two-digit industries that we consider (see
nfra), we need to control for unobserved productivity shocks 𝜔 it , which
re potentially correlated with the firm’s input choices. We apply the
stimation procedure proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2015) using the in-
ight that optimal input choices hold information about unobserved pro-
uctivity. We denote the logarithms of Q it , N it , M it and K it by q it , n it , m it 
nd k it , respectively. 
We impose the following timing assumptions. Capital k it is assumed
o be decided a period ahead (at 𝑡 − 1 ) because of planning and instal-
ation lags. Labor is “less variable ” than material. More precisely, n it is
hosen by firm i at time 𝑡 − 𝑏 (0 < b < 1), after k it being chosen at 𝑡 − 1
ut prior to m it being chosen at t . This assumption is consistent with
rms needing time to train new workers, with firms facing significant
iring or firing costs for labor, or with labor contracts being long term
s e.g. in unionized firms/industries. 
We assume that unobservable productivity ( 𝜔 it ) evolves according
o an endogenous first-order Markov process. In particular, we allow
 firm’s decision to import to endogenously affect future productivity,
hich is supported by evidence in international economics applications
see e.g. Amiti and Konings, 2007; Halpern et al., 2015; Kasahara and
odrigue, 2008 ). The intuition behind this assumption is that importing
s associated with higher firm productivity through access to more vari-
ties of intermediate inputs, access to higher quality inputs, and through
earning effects. As such, we can decompose 𝜔 it into its conditional ex-
ectation given the information known by the firm in 𝑡 − 1 (denoted
 𝑖𝑡 −1 ) and a random innovation to productivity (denoted 𝜉it ): 
 𝑖𝑡 = E [ 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 |𝐼 𝑖𝑡 −1 ] + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
= E [ 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 |𝜔 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −1 ] + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
= 𝑔( 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −1 ) + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (20) 
ith 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −1 the import status of firm i at period 𝑡 − 1 and g ( · ) a general
unction. 𝜉it is assumed to be mean independent of the firm’s information
et at 𝑡 − 1 . 
Given these timing assumptions, firm i ’s intermediate input demand
t t depends directly on n chosen prior to m , i.e. the input demandit it 
203 unction for m it is conditional on n it : 
8 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚 𝑡 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 ) (21)
Eq. (21) shows that firm i ’s intermediate input demand decision is a
unction of the state variables n it , k it , IMP it and 𝜔 it . It is crucial that 𝜔 it 
s the only unobservable entering the intermediate input demand func-
ion. This scalar unobservable assumption together with the assumption
hat m t ( · ) is strictly increasing in 𝜔 it conditional on n it , k it and IMP it 
strict monotonicity assumption), 9 allow to invert 𝜔 it as a function of
bservables: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚 −1 𝑡 ( 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) (22)
Considering the logarithmic version of Eq. (19) and allowing for an
diosyncratic error term including non-predictable output shocks and
otential measurement error in output and inputs ( 𝜖it ) gives: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 ; 𝛃) + 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (23)
here 𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 with 𝜖it assumed to be mean independent of current
nd past input choices. 10 
We approximate f ( · ) by a second-order polynomial where all logged
nputs, logged inputs squared and interaction terms between logged in-
uts are included (translog production function): 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑛 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑛 2 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝑚 
2 
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘 
2 
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑚 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽𝑛𝑘 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (24) 
here 𝛽0 has to be interpreted as the mean efficiency level across firms.
Substituting Eq. (22) in Eq. (24) results in a first-stage equation of
he form: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚 −1 𝑡 ( 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑 𝑡 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (25)
hich has the purpose of separating 𝜔 it from 𝜖it , i.e. eliminating the
ortion of output y it determined by unanticipated shocks at time t , mea-
urement error or any other random noise ( 𝜖it ). 
Hence, the first stage involves using Eq. (25) and the moment con-
ition E[ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 |𝐼 𝑖𝑡 ] = 0 , with I it the firm’s information set at t , to ob-
ain an estimate ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 of the composite term 𝜑 𝑡 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑓 𝑖𝑡 +
 
−1 
𝑡 ( 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) , which represents output net of 𝜖it . In our ap-
lication, estimation of Eq. (25) is implemented by regressing output
n a second-order polynomial series expansion where all logged inputs,
ogged inputs squared and interaction terms between logged inputs are
ncluded. To allow for time variation in 𝜑 t , these polynomial terms are
nteracted with a time trend. 
Given a particular set of parameters 𝜷, we can compute (up to a
calar constant) an estimate of 𝜔 it : 
̂ 𝑖𝑡 ( 𝛃) = ?̂? −1 𝑡 ( 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 ) 
= ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽𝑛 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑚 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑛 2 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝑚 
2 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘 
2 
𝑖𝑡 
− 𝛽 𝑛 𝑚 − 𝛽 𝑛 𝑘 − 𝛽 𝑚 𝑘 (26) 




























































































c  In order to implement the second stage and to identify the production
unction coefficients, we need to recover the innovation to productivity
it to form moments on. Using Eq. (26) , a consistent (non-parametric)
pproximation to E[ 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 |𝜔 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −1 ] is given by the predicted values
rom regressing nonparametrically ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 ( 𝛃) on ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 −1 ( 𝛃) and 𝐼 𝑀 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −1 . The
esidual from this regression provides us with an estimate of 𝜉it . 
Given the timing assumptions on input use, the following popula-
ion moment conditions can be defined: E [ 𝜉𝑖𝑡 ( 𝛽) 𝐝 ] = 0 where the set of
nstruments is: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 
{
𝑛 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 
2 
𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝑚 
2 
𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝑘 
2 
𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 −1 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 −1 , 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 −1 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 −1 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 
}
(27)
Exploiting these moment conditions, we can now estimate the pro-
uction function coefficients 𝜷 using standard GMM and rely on block
ootstrapping for the standard errors. The estimated production func-
ion coefficients ̂𝛃 are then used together with data on inputs to compute
he output elasticities at the firm-year level. In particular, we calculate
he elasticity of output with respect to labor at the firm-year level as: 
 ̂𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑛 + 2 ̂𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑚 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑘 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 (28)
Similarly, we calculate the elasticity of output with respect to mate-
ial at the firm-year level as: 11 
 ̂𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑚 + 2 ̂𝛽𝑚𝑚 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 (29)
Using the shares of labor and intermediate input expenditure in total
ales, s Nit and s Mit , respectively, and our estimates of the output elastic-
ties, ( ̂𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 and ( ̂𝜀 
𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 , we are able to compute 𝜇𝑖𝑡 and ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 . Since we
nly observe 𝑌 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑄 𝑖𝑡 exp ( 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) , we do not observe the correct expendi-
ure shares for N it and M it . We can recover an estimate of 𝜖it from the
rst stage to adjust the expenditure shares as follows: 12 
 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 
𝑌 𝑖𝑡 
exp ( 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) 
(30)
 𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 
𝐽 𝑖𝑡 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 
𝑃 𝑖𝑡 
𝑌 𝑖𝑡 
exp ( 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ) 
(31)
Using Eqs. (28) –(31) , we compute 𝜇𝑖𝑡 and ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 as follows: 
?̂?𝑡 = 





̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 










Based on the estimates 𝜇𝑖𝑡 and ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 , we are able to determine the
roduct market setting PMS ∈ {PC,IC} and the labor market setting
MS ∈ {PR,EB,MO} of firm i at time t and hence, firm i ’s regime of
ompetitiveness R ∈ ℜ = { PC-PR,IC-PR,PC-EB,IC-EB,PC-MO,IC-MO} at
ime t as follows. We first compute the 95% two-sided confidence inter-
als (CI) for 𝜇it and 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 





• 95% confidence interval for 𝜇it : [




𝐴 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝐵 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
]
(34)
with ̂𝜎𝜇𝑖𝑡 the standard error of 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , which is an estimator of the stan-
dard deviation of the sampling distribution of 𝜇𝑖𝑡 . 
• 95% confidence interval for gap Nit : [




𝐴 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 , 𝐵 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 
]
(35)
with ̂𝜎 the standard error of ̂𝑔𝑎𝑝 . 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 𝑁𝑖𝑡 
11 Under a Cobb–Douglas production function, ( 𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 and ( 𝜀 
𝑄 
𝑀 
) 𝑖𝑡 would be equal 
o 𝛽𝑛 and 𝛽𝑚 , respectively. 
12 This correction is important as it eliminates any variation in expenditure 




204 To determine firm i ’s PMS at time t , we use the 95% CI for 𝜇it : 
• If the lower bound of the 95% CI ( 𝐴 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ) is lower than or equal to
unity, firm i is characterized to be perfectly competitive (PC) at time
t . 
• If 𝐴 𝜇𝑖𝑡 exceeds unity, firm i is characterized by imperfect competition
(IC) at time t . 
To determine firm i ’s LMS at time t , we compare the 95% CIs for
ap Nit and 𝜇it . In particular, firm i 
• is characterized by perfect competition/right-to-manage bargaining
(PR) at time t if the 95% CIs for gap Nit and 𝜇it overlap which implies
that ̂𝜇𝑖𝑡 is not significantly different from ̂𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 , hence ̂𝜓 𝑖𝑡 = 0 at the
5% significance level. 
• is characterized by efficient bargaining (EB) at time t if 𝐴 𝜇𝑖𝑡 > 𝐵 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 ,
hence ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 > 0 at the 5% significance level. 
• is characterized by monopsony (MO) at time t if 𝐴 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑁𝑖𝑡 > 𝐵 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , hence
?̂? 𝑖𝑡 < 0 at the 5% significance level. 
Once firm i ’s regime at time t is determined, we are able to quan-
ify market power in product and labor markets. As explained in Sec-
ion 3, the product and labor market imperfection parameters are de-
ived from the estimated joint market imperfections parameter ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 and
heir respective standard errors are computed using the Delta method
 Wooldridge, 2002 ). 
. Data 
Our data come from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure
nd Activities (BSJBSA) compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
nd Industry (METI) in Japan. The purpose of this survey is to capture an
verall picture of Japanese corporate activities, including globalization
nd diversification, as well as basic corporate characteristics, including
ales, costs, profits, employment, assets and debt. The survey is compul-
ory for firms with more than 50 employees and with capital of more
han 30 million yen in both manufacturing and some service industries
uch as wholesale trade, retail trade, and information and communica-
ion. In this study, we focus on manufacturing firms only. 
In the BSJBSA, an industry classification code is assigned to each
rm based on their main activities. For example, let us assume that a
rm engages in both manufacturing and wholesale trade activities. If its
argest revenue comes from manufacturing activities, the firm is clas-
ified as a manufacturing firm. This implies that manufacturing firms
o not necessarily engage in manufacturing activities only. Some firms
witch from one industry to another during the sample period. Although
witching behavior of firms is an important issue, each firm is assigned
o the industry to which it belongs most frequently during our sample
eriod. 
The variables involved in our regression analyses are defined and
easured in the following way. Output ( Q ) is defined as real gross out-
ut measured by nominal sales divided by an industry-wide gross out-
ut price index. Labor ( N ) refers to the average number of permanent
orkers. Material input is defined as intermediate consumption deflated
y an industry-wide intermediate consumption price index. The capital
tock ( K ) is measured by the real capital stock computed from tangible
ssets and investment based on the perpetual inventory method. The
rice deflators are obtained from the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP)
014 database, which was compiled by RIETI and Hitotsubashi Univer-
ity. 13 The shares of labor ( s N ) and material input ( s M ) are constructed
y dividing respectively the firm total labor cost and undeflated inter-
ediate consumption by the firm undeflated production. The cost of
apital is defined as the user cost of capital times the real capital stock.
he user cost of capital is computed from the investment goods price
eflator times the sum of the interest rate and the depreciation rate mi-
us changes in the investment goods price. In addition, we use the firm’s13 For more details on the JIP database, see Fukao et al. (2007) . 























































































































ge and its share of non-production workers as controls in the regression
odels, where the latter is defined as the ratio of non-production work-
rs to total employees. We calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
 HHI ) at the industry-year level to obtain a measure of market concen-
ration. 
We first deleted firm-year observations with cost shares greater than
r equal to one and smaller than or equal to zero. In order to remove
utliers, we also disregarded firm-year observations with cost shares in
he bottom 1% and top 1% of the respective industry-year distributions.
e selected firms that survive at least two consecutive years because
agged inputs are needed to construct moment conditions in our estima-
ion framework. We obtain an unbalanced estimation sample consisting
f 64,481 observations for 7,458 firms over the years 1994-2012, which
e decompose into 15 two-digit industries. 14 Table A.1 in Appendix re-
orts the panel structure of the estimation sample. Table A.2 reports the
umber of observations and firms by industry. 
In addition to standard firm accounting information and the control
ariables mentioned above, the BSJBSA also provides information on
rms’ export and import behavior and foreign direct investment. A firm
eporting positive exports is classified as an exporter. Multinational en-
erprises consist of two types of firms: foreign-owned firms and Japanese
rms that engage in FDI. A foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm with
 foreign capital share greater than 50% and with headquarters located
utside of Japan. A firm that has at least one foreign affiliate is regarded
s a firm engaging in FDI. 15 As reported in Hoshi (2018) , Japan is known
o have an exceptionally low share of foreign-owned firms, which is con-
rmed in our sample: only 1% of firms engages in inward FDI. 
From Table A.2 in Appendix , it follows that a minority of firms within
n industry export and/or have networks of foreign affiliates: the overall
hare of manufacturing firms that export is 25% and 16% of firms are
dentified as MNEs. 46% of exporters are MNEs and 73% of MNEs are
xporting. There is considerable variation in export market participation
ates and in the importance of FDI as a mode of serving the foreign mar-
et across manufacturing industries. In particular, the share of exporters
anges from only 6% in wood, wooden products and furniture to 50% in
hemicals. Likewise, the share of MNEs ranges from only 4% in pulp, pa-
er and paper products to 27% in chemicals. The shares of exporting and
mporting firms are significantly positively correlated across industries.
pproximately 71% of exporters and 53% of MNEs also import. These
ndings are consistent with evidence in a wide range of other countries
see e.g. Bernard et al., 2012; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; World Trade
rganization, 2008 ). 
Table 1 reports the means of our variables for the total estimation
ample and split according to international activity. In the total esti-
ation sample, real firm output, labor, materials and the Solow resid-
al or conventional TFP measure have been stable over the considered
eriod while capital has decreased at an average annual growth rate
f 4.3%. On average, firm age equals 45 years, 35% of total employ-
es are non-production workers and the price-cost margin amounts to
2%. Consistent with previous studies, our data reveal that exporters
re systematically different from non-exporters. Among manufactur-
ng firms, exporters pay higher wages, are larger, older, more capital-
ntensive, employ more non-production workers and are more produc-
ive. Table 1 also reveals that MNEs show the same performance differ-
nces as exporters. 
Table A.3 in Appendix confirms these observations by summarizing
he average percent difference for a particular characteristic between14 According to the website of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
he number of firms surveyed in manufacturing was 15,007 in 2012, with 12,891 
rms responding (response rate = 85.9%). Only selecting firms that survive at 
east two consecutive years, which is a necessary condition for our estimation 
rocedure, causes the decline in our sample size. 
15 If foreign-owned firms also have foreign affiliates outside Japan, they are not 
lassified as FDI firms but as foreign-owned firms. In the BSJBSA, a Japanese 







205 ither exporters and non-exporters, or between MNEs and non-MNEs.
he set of characteristics include the logarithms of firm size (employ-
ent), value added per worker, TFP, average wages, capital per worker,
hare of non-production workers and price-cost markups. The firm-year
arying TFP and markup estimates are obtained by estimating translog
roduction functions separately for each of our 15 industries. In order
o ensure that the strict monotonicity assumption between productivity
nd intermediate inputs holds, we follow e.g. De Loecker and Warzyn-
ki (2012) and Ahsan and Mitra (2014) by ruling out inordinately high
arkups in the remainder of our empirical analysis. 16 
All results in column (1) of Table A.3 are from bivariate OLS regres-
ions of a firm characteristic on a dummy variable indicating either a
rm’s export status or a firm’s MNE status. Column (2) includes indus-
ry fixed effects and the logarithm of firm size as additional controls.
olumn (1) shows that there are substantial mean differences between
xporters and non-exporters, and between MNEs and non-MNEs. As ex-
ort/MNE participation is correlated with industry characteristics and
rm size, the inclusion of industry fixed effects and firm size in column
2) reduces the magnitude of these coefficients. Exporters remain dif-
erent from non-exporters even within the same disaggregated industry:
xporters are more productive by 13% for value added per worker and
y 2.0 % for total factor productivity, they pay higher wages by approxi-
ately 9% and are relatively more capital- and skill-intensive than non-
xporters by approximately 7% and 30%, respectively. MNEs exhibit
imilar performance differences as exporters. One difference, though,
s that there does not seem to be significant markup differences be-
ween exporters and non-exporters within the same industry whereas
arkups appear to be approximately 6% lower in MNEs. The former
nding seems to be driven by correlations between firm observables
nd a firm’s export status which are not controlled for in the bivari-
te OLS regression model. If we control for a richer set of firm observ-
bles as well as industry and time fixed effects, we observe a positive
orrelation between export status and markups (see infra, in particular
able 4 ). As hypothesized in Section 2 , the latter could be explained
hrough strategies of dumping and transfer pricing exerting negative ef-
ects on markups of MNEs, despite the observed positive productivity
ifferential between MNEs and non-MNEs. Table 1 in the online supple-
entary material illustrates large variation in mean TFP and markup
ifferences across industries. 
. Firm heterogeneity in regimes of competitiveness 
Based on the estimates of 𝜇it and 𝜓 it , we obtain firm-year varying
roduct market settings, labor market settings and regimes. We first ex-
mined firm-level persistence in the type of competition prevailing in
roduct and labor markets and, hence, in the regime of competitiveness
y investigating one-year transition probability rates across respective
tates over the period, where the states are defined as {PC,IC} in the case
f PMS, {PR,EB,MO} in the case of LMS and {PC-PR,IC-PR,PC-EB,IC-
B,PC-MO,IC-MO} in the case of R. At the overall level, we find rather
trong persistence in types of competitiveness as we observe the high-
st values on the diagonal for each regime. In particular, the fraction
f firms remaining in their initial state ranges between 70% (PC-PR)
nd 93% (PC-MO). However, firm-year transitions appear to be impor-
ant and the degree of persistence in regimes varies considerably across
ndustries. 17 
We then determined the firm-specific PMS, LMS and regime by re-
aining the relevant type (PMS/LMS/R) that occurs most frequently in16 In particular, we trimmed the parameter estimates of 𝜇it and gap Nit at the 
st and 99th percentiles of the respective industry-year distributions to remove 
utliers. 
17 For example, in transport equipment, only 14% of firms characterized by 
C-PR stay in their initial state while in iron and steel, this holds for as much 
s 96% of firms typified by PC-MO. These detailed results are not reported but 
vailable upon request. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics: Total estimation sample, and by export and MNE status, 1994-2012 
Mean Total Exporters Non-exporters MNEs Non-MNEs 
Real firm output growth Δq it − 0.004 0.001 − 0.007 0.001 − 0.006 
Labor growth rate Δn it − 0.010 − 0.007 − 0.011 − 0.006 − 0.010 
Material growth rate Δm it − 0.012 − 0.009 − 0.014 − 0.008 − 0.013 
Capital growth rate Δk it − 0.043 − 0.041 − 0.044 − 0.043 − 0.043 
Labor share in nominal sales s Nit 0.197 0.196 0.198 0.180 0.202 
Material share in nominal sales s Mit 0.582 0.592 0.578 0.614 0.573 
1 − 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 0.221 0.212 0.225 0.206 0.225 
Average wage W it 5.224 5.915 4.914 6.019 4.992 
Number of workers N it 433 873 236 1,208 207 
Age 45 49 43 52 43 
Exporter dummy EXP it 0.310 1.000 0.000 0.758 0.179 
Importer dummy IMP it 0.270 0.645 0.101 0.660 0.156 
MNE dummy MNE it 0.226 0.552 0.079 1.000 0.000 
Export-sales ratio 0.032 0.105 0.000 0.097 0.014 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI Jt 0.070 0.072 0.069 0.074 0.069 
Capital intensity 1.617 1.733 1.565 1.817 1.559 
Share of non-production workers 0.348 0.398 0.325 0.397 0.333 
Labor productivity 32.580 36.273 30.920 39.496 30.564 
SR it 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.014 
N 64,481 19,998 44,483 14,557 49,924 
Note: 𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝑞 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑛 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑚 𝑖𝑡 − (1 − 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 )Δ𝑘 𝑖𝑡 . 
Table 2 
Probability of being characterized by PMS = IC and LMS = {EB,MO} - Probit estimation. 
Specification 1 (baseline) Specification 2 
Pr ( PMS = IC| x ) a Pr ( LMS = EB| x ) b Pr ( LMS = MO| x ) b Pr ( PMS = IC| x ) a Pr ( LMS = EB| x ) b Pr ( LMS = MO| x ) b 
dF / dx dF / dx dF / dx dF / dx dF / dx dF / dx 
Exporter dummy (EXP) 0.011 0.042 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.028 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.014 ∗ ∗ 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) 
MNE dummy (MNE) − 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.013 − 0.023 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.058 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.020 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) 
EXP ×MNE 0.011 − 0.021 0.013 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) 
TFP − 0.020 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.020 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.131 0.420 ∗ ∗ − 0.286 ∗ ∗ 0.129 0.424 ∗ ∗ − 0.289 ∗ ∗ 
(0.138) (0.193) (0.142) (0.138) (0.193) (0.142) 
Size − 0.034 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.048 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.021 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.034 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.048 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.021 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age 0.0002 0.0017 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0007 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0001 0.0016 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0007 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Share of non-production workers − 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.030 ∗ ∗ − 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.030 ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood − 16,575.3 − 45,580.7 − 16,576.8 − 45,583.8 
Pseudo R 2 0.539 0.539 
N 64,481 64,481 64,481 64,481 
Notes: Significance level of ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%, ∗ ∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications). 
a Marginal effects of univariate probit model. 






















18 As shown by De Loecker et al. (2016) , firms charge lower markups on prod- 
ucts that are farther from their core competency (main product), consistent with 
heterogeneous models of multi-product firms such as, e.g., Mayer et al. (2014) . 
Theoretical work on the provision of good-services bundles include, e.g., 
Breinlich et al. (2014) , Lee et al. (2016) and Blanchard et al. (2017) . The former rder to examine the link between the internationalization status of
rms and the type of product and labor market competition in a de-
criptive way. Table A.4 in Appendix presents the percentage of firms
elonging to each of the six regimes of competitiveness for different
ubsets of firms. Among all manufacturing firms, about 25% are char-
cterized by perfect competition and 75% by imperfect competition in
he product market. The dominant labor market setting is efficient bar-
aining (EB; 42% of the firms), followed by perfect competition/right-
o-manage bargaining (PR; 30% of the firms) and monopsony (MO; 28%
f the firms). As such, the predominant regimes are IC-EB (42% of the
rms), IC-PR (18% of the firms) and IC-MO (15% of the firms). 
Table 2 in the online supplementary material shows considerable
eterogeneity in regimes across and within manufacturing industries.
iven that our data comprise a set of heterogeneous industries, such het-a
206 rogeneity could be driven by product differentiation across firms and
y the process of servitization, since servitization amounts to providing
ackages of goods and services, which is a way of increasing product
ifferentiation. 18 
Let us now focus on the prevalence of regimes across firms that dif-
er in terms of international activities. Comparing firms that differ ac-
ording to export status reveals that a larger fraction of exporters arend latter also assess empirically the determinants of firm servitization. 


























































































































haracterized by PMS = IC (79% of exporters compared to 67% of non-
xporters). Exporters are dominantly characterized by efficient bargain-
ng (46% of exporting firms) and far less so by monopsony (only 22%
f exporting firms) whereas the three labor market settings are more
venly distributed among non-exporters. As such, market power on the
upply side seems to be predominantly responsible for distorting factor
rices among exporters. The distribution of product and labor market
ettings and regimes across MNEs (non-MNEs) is very similar to the one
cross exporters (non-exporters). 
The descriptive analysis presented above does not give a detailed
icture on potential differences in firms’ regimes across modes of inter-
ationalization for two main reasons. First, it does not exploit time vari-
tion in a firm’s product and labor market setting. Second, it does not
ake into account correlations between firm observables and a firm’s ex-
ort/MNE status which could partially account for differences between
xporters and non-exporters and/or between MNEs and non-MNEs. In-
eed, firm i ’s product market setting at time t might depend on its en-
agement in international activities, other observable characteristics as
ell as unobservable factors 𝜖 such as managerial ability. To allow the
arginal effect of being an exporter (MNE) to depend on MNE (EXP)
tatus, we include an interaction term which is the product of the bi-
ary variables export status and MNE status. Suppressing firm and time
ubscripts ( i and t , respectively) for simplicity, we thus have: 
 𝑀𝑆 ∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 EXP + 𝛽2 MNE + 𝛽3 ( EXP × MNE ) + 𝛽4 ̂𝜔 + 𝐳𝛽𝑧 + 𝜖 (36)
ith EXP export status, MNE MNE status and ?̂? estimated TFP. 19 The
ector z comprises firm-year varying variables such as a firm’s size
number of workers), age and the share of non-production workers; the
erfindahl-Hirschman index, a set of time dummies and industry fixed
ffects. In order to investigate the link between the internationaliza-
ion status of firms and the likelihood of being characterized by imper-
ect competition in the product market, we specify the following probit
odel: 
r ( PMS=IC |𝐱) = Φ( 𝐱𝛽) (37)
The baseline category is PMS = PC and the vector x includes the re-
ressors specified in Eq. (36) . 
Whether market power in firm i in period t is consolidated on ei-
her the supply side or the demand side of labor might be influenced by
ommon observable as well as unobservable factors such as a firm’s cor-
orate culture. To take into account the full covariance structure and to
nvestigate the link between the internationalization status of firms and
he likelihood of being characterized by either efficient bargaining or
onopsony, we specify the following two-equation multivariate probit
odel: 
𝑀𝑆 ∗ 𝑚 = 𝐱 𝑚 𝛽𝑚 + 𝜖𝑚 , 𝑚 = 1 , 2 
𝑀𝑆 𝑚 = 𝐼 ( 𝐿𝑀 𝑆 ∗ 𝑚 > 0) , 𝑚 = 1 , 2 (38) 
𝛜 = ( 𝜖1 , 𝜖2 ) ′ ∼ 𝑁(0 , Σ) 
here 𝐿𝑀𝑆 1 = Pr ( LMS = EB| x ) and 𝐿𝑀𝑆 2 = Pr ( LMS = MO| x ). The base-
ine category is LMS = PR. We include the same regressors as in the
nivariate probit model ( Eq. (37) ). 
Table 2 presents the marginal effect of the regressors in the univari-
te and the multivariate probit models. As such, columns 1 and 4 re-
ort how much the (conditional) probability of being characterized by
MS = IC changes when the value of a regressor changes, holding all
ther regressors constant whereas columns 2-3 and 5-6 show how much
he likelihood of being characterized by either LMS = EB or LMS = MO
hanges. Accounting for the use of a generated regressor, we employ
lock bootstrapping for statistical inference. 
We consider two specifications. The baseline specification (specifi-
ation 1) permits testing the hypothesis that the effect of serving the19 Since productivity is inherently a relative concept, we normalize the firm- 




207 oreign market through exporting (FDI) is the same for MNEs and non-
NEs (exporters and non-exporters) whereas specification 2 does not
nclude the interacted regressor. The parameters of interest are 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 
nd 𝛽3 . 
The estimates of the baseline specification indicate that the coeffi-
ient on the interaction term (EXP ×MNE) is not significantly different
rom zero in both the univariate and bivariate probit models. Therefore,
e rely on the estimates of specification 2 and focus the discussion on
ur variables of interest. 
Being an exporter increases the likelihood of being characterized by
mperfect competition in the product market by 1.4 percentage points,
ven after controlling for productivity differences. This result is con-
istent with the conjecture that exporters have a higher probability of
perating in an imperfectly competitive product market setting relative
o non-exporters (conjecture 1a in Section 2.1 ). This finding could be ex-
lained by quality differences or differences in demand elasticities and
ncome across domestic and export markets, generating markup differ-
nces between exporters and non-exporters. Conjecture 3a, postulating
hat exporters have a higher probability (relative to non-exporters) to
perate in a collective bargaining labor market setting, is confirmed.
ore precisely, we find that being an exporter increases the likelihood
f being characterized by LMS = EB by 3.7 percentage points whereas
t decreases the likelihood of being characterized by LMS = MO by 2.4
ercentage points. Put differently, exporting firms are more likely to
hare rents based on the bargaining power of workers, but less likely
o share rents based on the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing
n individual employer. This former rent-sharing mechanism could be
xplained by the fact that exporters, which charge higher markups and
ealize higher rents, are willing to share part of these rents with their
orkers according to a surplus-sharing rule. 
When focusing on correlations between being an MNE and the like-
ihood of being characterized by PMS = IC, LMS = EB or LMS = MO,
espectively, we get a completely different picture. We interpret this
s evidence of clear differences in behavior between firms that serve
he foreign market either through exporting or through FDI. Controlling
or differences in productivity, we find that being an MNE decreases the
robability of being characterized by imperfect competition in the prod-
ct market by 2.3 percentage points. This result, which is consistent with
he conjecture that multinationals are less likely to operate in an imper-
ectly competitive product market setting (conjecture 1b in Section 2.1 ),
an be explained by strategies of dumping and transfer pricing exerting
pposite (that is, negative) effects on markups than channels of qual-
ty and demand elasticity differences. Based on empirical evidence on
ultinationals perceiving higher labor demand elasticities and engag-
ng more in international rent sharing if affiliates are located in low-
ax countries, we hypothesized that MNEs are less likely to operate in a
closed-economy) collective bargaining labor market setting (conjecture
b in Section 2.1 ). We find support for this conjecture. More precisely,
eing a firm that serves the foreign market through FDI decreases the
ikelihood of being characterized by LMS = EB by 5.8 percentage points
hereas it increases the likelihood of being characterized by LMS = MO
y 2.0 percentage points. The latter finding is compatible with MNEs
aving considerable monopsony power in the labor market due to, e.g.,
igh intra-firm labor replacement in such firms. 
Since, to the best of our knowledge, existing theories and empiri-
al analyses on the relationship between internationalization status and
he nature of competition in product and labor markets are nonexis-
ent, we are not in a position to postulate conjectures in terms of the
elationship between internationalization status and the likelihood of
eing characterized by a particular regime R = { PC-PR,IC-PR,PC-EB,IC-
B,PC-MO,IC-MO}. However, based on our “separate ” conjectures (see
ection 2 ), we tested the following “joint ” conjectures: 
Joint conjecture 1: Exporters are likely to operate in an imperfectly
ompetitive product market setting and a collective bargaining labor
arket setting. 










































































































t  Joint conjecture 2: Multinationals are less likely to operate in an
mperfectly competitive product market setting and a collective bargain-
ng labor market setting. 
The results, that we obtain from estimating a multinomial logit
odel, support both joint conjectures. More precisely, we find that being
n exporter increases the probability of being characterized by R = IC-
B (rather than being characterized by one of the five other regimes)
y 4.6 percentage points (relative to being a non-exporter) whereas the
robability of being characterized by R = IC-EB is on average 5.6 percent-
ge points lower for multinationals than for non-MNEs with the same
haracteristics. 20 
Robustness checks. We performed two robustness checks. 21 First,
iven that our theoretical structural productivity model applies more
o domestic firms deciding to export and/or to invest abroad than to
oreign-owned firms operating in Japan, we checked the sensitivity of
ur main results with respect to excluding firms engaging in inward FDI.
ince the share of foreign-owned firms is only about one percent, our
ain results are robust to the exclusion of foreign-owned firms. 
Second, we checked the sensitivity of our main results with respect
o excluding firms that switch internationalization status. Comparing
xporters to non-exporters, we observe that 78.5% of firms in our sam-
le are non-switchers, among which 17.1% are non-switching exporters
nd 61.4% are non-switching non-exporters. 54% of firms that change
xport status only switch once and 28% switch twice. Comparing MNEs
o non-MNEs, we observe that 84% of firms are non-switchers, among
hich 11.8% are non-switching MNEs and 72.2% are non-switching
on-MNEs. 68% of firms that change MNE status only switch once and
2% switch twice. If we take into account potential selection bias aris-
ng from only retaining non-switching firms, where we model Pr ( non-
witching = 1 |𝐱) = Φ( 𝐱𝛽) with the vector x including the 1-year lag of TFP
?̂? 𝑖𝑡 −1 
)
and the capital stock 
(
𝑘 𝑖𝑡 −1 
)
, our main results are confirmed. 22 If
e do not take such selectivity into account, conjecture 1a is no longer
onfirmed whereas we continue to find support for conjectures 1b, 3a
nd 3b. We put forward two reasons for this finding. First, it may be due
o the reduced sample size because we lose 35% of observations (27% of
rms) by discarding switching firms. Second, the behavior of continuing
xporters/MNEs might be different from future exiting exporters/MNEs.
vidence for the latter explanation is given by Tan et al. (2016) , who
nd that continuing exporters set a lower price than future exiting firms,
hich is compatible with our result. To address this issue further, we
eed more detailed data such as firm-level prices, which are not avail-
ble in our sample. 
. Market imperfections and export/MNE status 
To get a first insight into the link between the internationalization
ype of firms and the degree of product and labor market imperfections,
able 3 reports median values of estimated parameters – markups ( 𝜇),
abor market imperfections (workers’ bargaining power 𝜙 or the wage
lasticity of a firm’s labor supply curve 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) and productivity ( 𝜔 )– for
ubsets of firms within a particular regime. We define subsets of firms
ased on their engagement in international activities. 
Let us focus the discussion on the regimes characterized by imperfect
ompetition in product as well as labor markets. Conditional on being
haracterized by R = IC-EB, we find that the median value of markup
stimates is lower for exporters relative to non-exporters (1.42 versus
.55). When comparing MNEs to non-MNEs, this discrepancy is larger20 These results are not reported but available upon request. 
21 The results of these robustness checks are not reported but available upon 
equest. 
22 As lagged productivity is included in the selection equation, we excluded 
his regressor in the univariate and the multivariate probit models which model 
he probability of being characterized by PMS = IC and LMS = {EB,MO} and 
ncluded the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model on the probability of 








208 1.35 versus 1.56). In addition, workers in MNEs seem to have a slightly
ower bargaining power than in non-MNEs (median value of 0.27 for the
ormer and 0.30 for the latter). 
Interestingly, the opposite picture appears when comparing subsets
f firms, conditional on being characterized by R = IC-MO. Irrespective
f whether firms serve the foreign market either through exporting or
hrough FDI, we find that firms that engage in international activities
eem to have larger market power in both product and labor markets.
ore specifically, the median value of markups is 1.21 for exporters
ompared to 1.16 for non-exporters and the median value of an indi-
idual firm’s labor supply elasticity is 1.48 for exporters compared to
.72 for non-exporters, implying that exporters have larger wage-setting
ower. On the labor side, the discrepancy is even larger when compar-
ng MNEs to non-MNEs (median value of 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
is 1.32 for the former and
.74 for the latter). 
The observed differences in the degree of market imperfection pa-
ameters discussed so far could, however, partly been driven by corre-
ations between firm observables and a firm’s export/MNE status. To
ddress this concern, we examine the links between the international-
zation status of firms and the degree of market imperfections within a
egression framework. We estimate the average effect of export/MNE
tatus (and other independent variables) on the degree of product and
abor market imperfections in a ‘representative enterprise’. As such, we
efine the following regression models: 23 
n ̂𝜇𝑖𝑡 +1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 EXP 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 MNE 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ( EXP × MNE ) 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 ̂𝜔 𝑖𝑡 




1 − 𝜙𝑖𝑡 +1 
) 
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 EXP 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 MNE 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ( EXP × MNE ) 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 ̂𝜔 𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛼5 IMR 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐳 𝑖𝑡 𝛼𝑧 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡 (40) 
n ( ̂𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 +1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 EXP 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 MNE 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ( EXP × MNE ) 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 ̂𝜔 𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛼5 IMR 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐳 𝑖𝑡 𝛼𝑧 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡 (41) 
ith IMR the inverse Mills ratio from the respective probit model, which
e include to account for selection bias, and the vector z comprising
he same regressors as in Section 6 . Because the effect of our regressors
f interest might not be instantaneous, we use the one-year lead of the
ependent variables. To deal with generated regressands and regressors,
e use block bootstrapping for statistical inference. As the share of rents
aptured by the workers ( 𝜙) lies within the [0,1]-range, we use a logit
ransformation to model the bargaining power of workers. 
Table 4 presents the average effect of the regressors in the three re-
ression models. Similar to the probit models specified above, we con-
ider two specifications. The baseline specification (specification 1) per-
its testing the hypothesis that the effect of serving the foreign market
hrough exporting (FDI) is the same for MNEs and non-MNEs (exporters
nd non-exporters) whereas specification 2 does not include the inter-
cted regressor. The parameters of interest are 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 . 
The estimates of the baseline specification indicate that the coeffi-
ient on the interaction term (EXP ×MNE) is not significantly different
rom zero in the three regression models. Therefore, we rely on the es-
imates of specification 2 and focus on our regressors of interest. Con-
itional on being characterized by PMS = IC, we observe a significantly23 One could argue that observable firm characteristics might correlate with 
nobservable firm characteristics such as managerial ability or workplace envi- 
onment, which would favor applying a fixed effects estimator. However, this 
ould render the interpretation of the effect of e.g. being an exporter difficult. 
his is because when firm fixed effects are included, identification originates 
rom changes in export status, implying that the benchmark would also com- 
rise continuing exporters. 
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Table 3 
Three-dimensional firm heterogeneity: Markups ( 𝜇), labor market imperfections (workers’ bargaining power 𝜙 or the wage 
elasticity of a firm’s labor supply curve 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
), and productivity ( 𝜔 ) 
R = PC-PR 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 R = IC-PR 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 
All firms 0.948 0.389 − 0.256 All firms 1.256 0.048 0.003 
Exporters 0.902 0.388 0.036 Exporters 1.235 0.033 − 0.120 
Non-exporters 0.965 0.390 − 0.380 Non-exporters 1.262 0.053 0.039 
MNEs 0.914 0.345 0.205 MNEs 1.214 0.033 − 0.141 
Non-MNEs 0.955 0.401 − 0.385 Non-MNEs 1.266 0.051 0.033 
R = PC-EB 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 𝛾 𝜙 R = IC-EB 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 𝛾 𝜙
All firms 1.020 0.758 − 0.047 1.243 0.555 All firms 1.518 0.713 − 0.073 0.408 0.290 
Exporters 0.989 0.738 0.077 1.207 0.543 Exporters 1.419 0.599 0.054 0.393 0.282 
Non-exporters 1.030 0.767 − 0.108 1.246 0.562 Non-exporters 1.554 0.769 − 0.117 0.414 0.293 
MNEs 0.985 0.730 0.183 1.149 0.546 MNEs 1.355 0.540 0.137 0.363 0.266 
Non-MNEs 1.029 0.763 − 0.111 1.276 0.556 Non-MNEs 1.560 0.769 − 0.122 0.420 0.296 
R = PC-MO 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 𝛽 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
R = IC-MO 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 𝛽 𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
All firms 0.863 − 1.713 0.159 0.332 0.542 All firms 1.175 − 0.749 0.089 0.620 1.633 
Exporters 0.858 − 1.747 0.186 0.325 0.508 Exporters 1.214 − 0.856 0.030 0.597 1.479 
Non-exporters 0.869 − 1.668 0.134 0.340 0.579 Non-exporters 1.156 − 0.692 0.116 0.633 1.723 
MNEs 0.834 − 1.979 0.216 0.296 0.463 MNEs 1.201 − 0.964 0.034 0.569 1.322 
Non-MNEs 0.877 − 1.595 0.129 0.354 0.593 Non-MNEs 1.167 − 0.696 0.105 0.635 1.737 
All regimes 𝜇 𝜓 𝜔 
All firms 1.230 0.248 − 0.031 
Exporters 1.181 0.102 0.048 
Non-exporters 1.254 0.299 − 0.064 
MNEs 1.166 0.091 0.104 
Non-MNEs 1.252 0.288 − 0.067 
Note: Median values of the relevant parameter estimates are reported. 
Table 4 
Mean regression results (OLS). 
Specification 1 (baseline) Specification 2 
Dependent variable ln ̂𝜇𝑖𝑡 +1 ln 
(
𝜙𝑖𝑡 +1 
1− ̂𝜙𝑖𝑡 +1 
)
ln ( ̂𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 +1 ln ̂𝜇𝑖𝑡 +1 ln 
(
𝜙𝑖𝑡 +1 
1− ̂𝜙𝑖𝑡 +1 
)
ln ( ̂𝜀 𝑁 
𝑊 
) 𝑖𝑡 +1 
Exporter dummy (EXP) 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.046 0.209 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.080 ∗ 0.201 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.050) (0.036) (0.008) (0.044) (0.032) 
MNE dummy (MNE) − 0.034 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.108 ∗ ∗ − 0.054 − 0.040 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.124 ∗ ∗ − 0.073 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.011) (0.055) (0.049) (0.009) (0.054) (0.028) 
EXP ×MNE − 0.010 0.026 − 0.032 
(0.013) (0.060) (0.059) 
TFP 0.001 − 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.301 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.001 − 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.302 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.005) (0.018) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index 0.433 ∗ − 0.633 6.957 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.434 ∗ − 0.618 6.965 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.244) (0.553) (0.753) (0.244) (0.727) (0.741) 
Size − 0.023 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.045 − 0.343 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.059 − 0.343 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.004) (0.041) (0.017) (0.004) (0.044) (0.017) 
Age 0.0004 ∗ ∗ − 0.0006 0.004 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0004 ∗ ∗ − 0.0006 0.004 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Share of non-production workers − 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.274 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.166 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.218 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.166 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.016) (0.079) (0.053) (0.016) (0.073) (0.052) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.101 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.065 − 0.925 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.216 − 0.927 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.032) (0.360) (0.166) (0.032) (0.375) (0.163) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R 2 0.146 0.268 0.493 0.146 0.268 0.493 
N 42,302 23,243 16,207 42,302 23,243 16,207 














ositive correlation between export status and product market power
 ̂𝜇), which confirms conjecture 2a (see Section 2.1 ). Controlling for pro-
uctivity differences, quality differences and differences in demand elas-
icities and income across domestic and export markets could drive this
nding. Conditional on being characterized by LMS = EB, we find a
ignificantly positive correlation between export status and labor mar-
et power consolidated on the labor supply side ( ̂𝜙), which provides209 upport for conjecture 4a. This might be interpreted as exporters being
illing to share a larger part of increased rents with their workers. Con-
itional on being characterized by LMS = MO, we detect a significantly
ositive correlation between export status and the wage elasticity of a
rm’s labor supply curve, implying that exporters are less able to exploit
age-setting power. 




































































































Panel structure: Number of participations. 
# of participations 
# obs. % # firms % 
2 1,074 1.7 1046 14.0 
3 1,817 2.8 886 11.9 
4 1,757 2.7 566 7.6 
5 2,297 3.6 551 7.4 
6 2,043 3.2 384 5.1 
7 2,117 3.3 333 4.5 
8 2,138 3.3 294 3.9 
9 2,418 3.7 283 3.8 
10 1,824 2.8 178 2.4 
11 2,310 3.6 212 2.8 
12 2,168 3.4 186 2.5 
13 1,949 3.0 155 2.1 
14 2,198 3.4 165 2.2 
15 2,153 3.3 150 2.0 
16 2,332 3.6 154 2.1 Based on hypothesis testing, we clearly reject the equality of the esti-
ated coefficients on export status and MNE status in each of the three
egression models. Confirming conjectures 2b and 4b, we find a sig-
ificantly negative correlation between MNE status and either product
arket power or workers’ bargaining power. The former finding could
e explained by strategies of dumping and transfer pricing having a neg-
tive impact on markups of MNEs. The latter again confirms that (the
hreat of) relocating plants from home to foreign countries might flatten
he labor demand curve and shift bargaining power over rent distribu-
ion from labor towards capital in MNEs. Our results also indicate that
NEs seem to have more wage-setting power, which could be explained
y high intra-firm labor replacement in such firms. 
In Table 4 in the online supplement, we show considerable cross-
ndustry variation in the average effects of internationalization status
or each regression model ( Eqs. (39) - (41) ). Given that we acknowledge
hat firms are heterogeneous, one could argue that the exclusive focus
n mean effects might be misleading. The online supplementary mate-
ial indeed confirms heterogeneous returns to being an exporter/MNE
ithin an industry and reveals cross-industry differences. 
Robustness checks. Similar to our analysis relating a firm’s interna-
ionalization status to the type of competition prevailing in product and
abor markets, we checked the sensitivity of our main results with re-
pect to excluding either firms engaging in inward FDI or firms switching
nternationalization status. 24 Our first robustness check confirms that
ur main results are robust to excluding foreign-owned firms operating
n Japan. From our second robustness check, it follows that the marginal
ffects of export and MNE status on workers’ bargaining power preserve
heir signs but turn to be insignificant if we do not account for selection
ias arising from only considering non-switching firms. This would im-
ly that conjecture 4a is no longer confirmed whereas we continue to
nd support for conjectures 2a, 2b and 4b. However, if we account for
election bias, all our main results are confirmed. 
. Conclusion 
Do the type and degree of labor market imperfections vary across
rms that differ in terms of internationalization? In spite of the grow-
ng importance of labor market imperfections in recent international
rade theory, this question has not been answered so far. Microe-
onometric studies in the field have predominantly provided evidence
f the well-established productivity premium of firms with interna-
ional activities relative to firms serving only domestic markets and
ave recently focused on the underlying sources of this productivity
dvantage. 
This paper examines the links between a firm’s internationalization
tatus and the type and degree of market imperfections in product and
abor markets using an unbalanced panel of 7,458 manufacturing firms
ver the period 1994-2012 in Japan. Our contribution to the econo-
etric literature on identifying market imperfections and the empirical
nternational trade literature is twofold. First, we develop a framework
or modelling heterogeneity across firms in terms of (i) product market
ower (price-cost markups), (ii) labor market imperfections (workers’
argaining power during worker-firm negotiations or a firm’s degree of
age-setting power) and (iii) revenue productivity. Second, we apply
his framework in order to examine whether pricing behavior in prod-
ct and labor markets depends on a firm’s internationalization status,
hile accounting for differences in revenue productivity. We consider
wo main forms of internationalization: exports and (predominantly out-
ard) foreign direct investment. As such, we are able to improve our
nderstanding of the wage determination process of firms that engage
ifferently in international activities. 24 The results of these robustness checks are not reported but available upon 
equest. 
210 Based on available theories and existing empirical evidence, we de-
ive conjectures about the relationships of interest, which are supported
y our findings. We observe clear differences in behavior between firms
hat serve the foreign market either through exporting or through FDI.
n particular, we find that being an exporter increases the likelihood
f being characterized by imperfect competition in the product mar-
et. Exporting firms are more likely to share rents based on the bar-
aining power of workers, but less likely to share rents based on the
lasticity of the labor supply curve facing an individual employer. In
ontrast, a firm’s wage-setting power rather than workers’ bargaining
ower appears to generate wage dispersion across firms engaging in
DI. 
Engagement in international activities also matters for determin-
ng the order of magnitude of imperfections in product and labor
arkets. Controlling for differences in productivity, we find a pos-
tive correlation between export status and product market power
markups) as well as market power consolidated on the labor supply
ide (workers’ bargaining power), whereas exporting firms seem less
ble to exploit wage-setting power. The opposite picture emerges for
ultinationals. 
Our analysis can be pursued in several directions, either to provide
ausal evidence or to examine some new developments. First, one obvi-
us research avenue is to establish the causal impact of trade/FDI lib-
ralization on firms’ market power in product and labor markets using
ctual liberalization episodes. Second, given that our study reveals con-
iderable heterogeneity in regimes of competitiveness across firms that
iffer in terms of internationalization status within the same industry,
t would be interesting to extend our productivity model to allow for
ulti-product firms and to examine the role of product differentiation
nd servitization in explaining such heterogeneity. Finally, acknowledg-
ng the important role of trade in intermediate inputs in today’s interna-
ional trade structure, another extension of our productivity model is to
ake into account imperfections in the intermediate input market. Condi-
ional on having data on domestically purchased and imported material
nputs, one could use such framework to interpret labor market imper-
ections as a source of contractual incompleteness and investigate their
mpact on sourcing decisions of multinationals. 
ppendix 17 2,679 4.2 167 2.2 
18 4,369 6.8 257 3.4 
19 26,838 41.6 1,491 20.0 
Total 64,481 100.0 7,458 100.0 
S. Dobbelaere, K. Kiyota Labour Economics 53 (2018) 198–212 
Table A.2 
Repartition by industry, export and MNE status. 
# obs. % # firms % % of % of 
exporters MNEs 
Total 64,481 100.0 7,458 100.0 24.7 15.4 
Food products and beverages 8,644 13.4 957 12.8 10.1 7.5 
Textiles and wearing apparel 3,345 5.2 498 6.7 13.0 13.8 
Wood, wooden products, and furniture 1,014 1.6 176 2.4 5.8 9.8 
Pulp, paper and paper products 2,362 3.7 251 3.4 7.2 4.0 
Publishing and printing 4,030 6.2 438 5.9 6.3 6.3 
Chemicals 5,869 9.1 557 7.5 50.4 26.5 
Petroleum and coal products 4,065 6.3 458 6.1 23.3 19.3 
Non-metallic mineral products 3,101 4.8 377 5.1 18.3 11.1 
Iron and steel 2,213 3.4 240 3.2 23.1 15.6 
Non-ferrous metals 1,659 2.6 183 2.5 31.5 18.5 
Fabricated metal products 5,164 8.0 609 8.2 18.0 10.7 
Machinery 7,005 10.9 797 10.7 43.8 20.3 
Electrical machinery 6,054 9.4 820 11.0 29.0 16.5 
Transport equipment 6,411 9.9 670 9.0 29.0 22.4 
Other manufacturing 3,545 5.5 427 5.7 41.6 21.2 
Exporters 19,998 31.0 1,859 24.9 100.0 45.5 
Non-exporters 44,483 69.0 5,599 75.1 0.0 5.7 
MNEs 14,557 22.6 1,163 15.6 72.7 100.0 
Non-MNEs 49,924 77.4 6,295 84.4 16.1 0.0 
Table A.3 
Exporter and MNE premia. 
Exporters MNEs 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
ln (employment it ) 0.780 
∗ ∗ ∗ – 1.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ –
ln (value added per worker it ) 0.273 
∗ ∗ ∗ 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.278 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
ln (TFP 𝑖𝑡 ) = ̂𝜔 𝑖𝑡 0.139 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.020 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.111 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.029 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
ln (wage it ) 0.196 
∗ ∗ ∗ 0.085 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.192 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.066 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
ln (capital per worker it ) 0.168 
∗ ∗ ∗ 0.069 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.257 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.097 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
ln (share of non-production workers it ) 0.306 
∗ ∗ ∗ 0.300 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.250 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.255 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
ln (markup 𝑖𝑡 ) = ln ̂𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 0.099 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 − 0.121 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.059 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Additional covariates 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
ln (employment) it No Yes No Yes 
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ : Significance level of 1%. Each row summarizes the average percent difference for a 
particular characteristic between either exporters and non-exporters, or MNEs and non-MNEs . 
All results in column (1) are from bivariate OLS regressions of a firm characteristic on a dummy 
variable indicating either a firm’s export status or a firm’s MNE status. Colum (2) includes industry 
fixed effects and ln (employment it ) as additional controls. 
Table A.4 
Percentage of firms in each regime: Total and by export/MNE status. 
# obs. # firms PC-PR IC-PR PC-EB IC-EB PC-MO IC-MO 
Total 64,481 7,458 12.0 17.9 1.6 42.0 11.0 15.4 
Exporters 19,998 1,859 11.4 19.7 1.4 45.0 8.1 14.4 
Non-exporters 44,483 5,599 12.8 13.5 2.0 36.1 18.2 17.5 
MNEs 14,557 1,163 11.7 18.2 1.6 44.1 9.5 14.9 
Non-MNEs 49,924 6,295 13.7 16.8 1.6 34.1 16.9 17.0 
Notes: R ∈ ℜ = { PC-PR,IC-PR,PC-EB,IC-EB,PC-MO,IC-MO}, with PMS ∈ {PC,IC} and LMS ∈ {PR,EB,MO}. 
PC refers to perfect competition, IC to imperfection competition, PR to perfect competition/right-to- 





A  upplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2018.05.004 . A  
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